**The Iraq War**

History 450/550 – CRN 12869/12882

Fall 2017

Mon., Wed., 12-1:20; 260 Condon

If only human beings were not masks behind masks behind masks. If only this world was a clean board of lines and intersections. If only time was a sequence of considered moves and not a chaos of slippages and blunders.

David Mitchell, The Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet (2010), p. 357.

Truth has long legs and treads the paths of deceit.

Mia Couto, The Last Flight of the Flamingo (2004), p. 83.

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**Office hours:** Wednesday 2-3:00, Thursday: 1:15-3:00, or by appointment (I am on campus most days and typically have a fairly open schedule outside of classes: we can arrange a time by email, phone or in class).

>>>> To get to my office: enter the south (front) entrance of McKenzie, take staircase on immediate left one floor up, exit to the left, take a right and follow the hall until it opens up a second time. My office is on the left. If the door is closed, please knock: if I am there, I am usually available. I'll tell you if I really cannot talk at that moment.

**Aims of course**

When I first started teaching “The Iraq War" in the summer of 2007 (the height of the civil war that was tearing Iraq apart, as we will see), I would often get the question, "The Iraq War? But that’s not history.” Since that time, however, something of a consensus has emerged regarding the main trajectory of the war, even as we still await an end to the longer war the 2003 invasion initiated.

The central aim of this course is to come to some understanding, first, of what motivated the Bush administration to invade in Iraq in 2003 and, second, of why that invasion, initially so successful in deposing Saddam Hussein, so signally failed to create a stable political regime in subsequent years. We will thus begin with a consideration of U.S. policy but increasingly shift our attention to Iraqi factors as we move forward in time. Toward the end of the term we will turn to more recent developments in Iraq, mostly notably the rise and (now I can write, at least with respect to Iraqi territory) fall of ISIS. Those developments will lead us to consider the Iraq War in a regional context.

An additional aim of this course is to distinguish those questions that can be answered, at least provisionally, as against those that must remain open, whether because the necessary materials are not yet available, or because we lack proper perspective. Another related issue is how we can write the history of current and on-going events at all. What kinds of assumptions must be made to stake out historical claims about events that might not have ended? What might we conclude about the validity of such claims? We are constantly being told what the war was “about” and whether it was “worth it.” On what basis can we evaluate such claims?

Those are some of the larger issues lurking in the background of this course. We will address them as they come up but the organizing principle of the course is much simpler. The central argument is that the origins of the war lay in the Bush administration’s decision to depose Saddam Hussein but that the U.S.'s aims and actions cannot explain the subsequent dynamics of the conflict. Any account that seeks to

understand what has happened in Iraq since the invasion must therefore take into account

the actions of Iraqis and other regional agents.

We will thus begin with U.S. decision-making and planning and then bring in

other factors as we get to the invasion and occupation. By the end of the term you should

be able to take a position, at least provisionally, on four fundamental issues:

1) The U.S. administration’s decision to invade Iraq (How did it arrive at the

decision? When? By what process? What were the administration’s aims? How did it

hope to achieve them?)

2) The trajectory of events from the fall of Saddam Hussein to 2008. (Why did the

situation in Iraq deteriorate so quickly? To what extent was the situation in Iraq due to

U.S. policies and actions on the part of the occupational authority? To what extent was it

due to Iraqi factors? And to what extent was it due to foreigners other than U.S. agents?

What happened in 2007-2008 to improve the situation? Was there any realistic possibility

that the occupation might have turned out differently?)

3) Developments in Iraq since the departure of U.S. forces in 2011 and, more

specifically, the emergence of ISIS as a major factor in shaping the situation in Iraq and

Syria.

4) More generally what is/was the Iraq War about? How does it fit into the larger “war on terror”? What is its significance for Iraq? For the Middle East more generally?

What might the future hold?

**Assignments and expectations**

Attendance and completion of course readings and assignments is expected.

Grades will be compiled on the basis of attendance and participation, two on-line written

midterms, an on-line final, and two short papers. For attendance and participation everyone will receive a baseline grade of 7.5 at the beginning of the term – this may move up or down depending on attendance and participation.

The assignments are designed to develop and test 1) basic factual knowledge of the Iraq

War; and 2) broader interpretive concepts as these apply to the Iraq War. I assess grades

according to a combination of these two elements. Please note the implication: you

cannot receive top scores simply by “knowing the facts.” The facts and evidence are important but they represent the point of departure, not the end point. The more important and interesting part of historical thinking is what one

does with all of the facts.

Students can expect to master the following learning objectives:

1) Recognize and assess different explanations of the Bush administration's decision to

invade Iraq.

2) Understand the religious and ethnic composition of Iraq; its governmental and

economic institutions; and the role these played after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

3) Recognize and assess different explanations of the course of events in Iraq from 2003-

2008.

4) Understand how events in Iraq fit within the context of the wider Middle East.

5) Gain familiarity with the basic analytic tools and styles of argument of the history of

contemporary events.

6) Learn about the documentary and analytic problems common to the history of

contemporary events.

**How grades will be computed**:

Attendance and participation 10% of grade

Two on-line written midterms 20% of grade each

Two short papers 15% of grade each

Final assignment 20% of grade due on-line,

Everything will be submitted on-line to the course Canvas site.

**Late policy**

With the exception of the final assignment, late submissions are accepted for up to a week after the due date.

One day (24 hrs.) or less: 10% reduction of total value

More than one day: 20% reduction of total value

**Important dates**

October 16: First midterm due on-line, 11:00 pm

October 26: First paper due on-line, 11:00 pm

November 9: Second paper due on-line, 11:00 pm

November 14: Second midterm due on-line, 11:00 pm

December 6 (Wed.): Final assignment due on-line, 12:00 noon

**Grading rubric**:

A+: Work of unusual distinction.

A: Work that distinguishes itself by the excellence of its grasp of the material and the

precision and insight of its argument, in addition to being well executed and reasonably free

of errors.

B: Work that satisfies main criteria of the assignment, and demonstrates command of the

material, but does not achieve the level of excellence that characterizes work of A quality.

C: Work that demonstrates a rudimentary grasp of the material and satisfies at least some of

the assigned criteria.

D: Work that demonstrates a poor grasp of the material and/or is executed with little regard

for college standards, but which exhibits some engagement with the material.

F: Work that is weak in every aspect, demonstrating a basic misunderstanding of the material

and/or disregard for the assigned question.

This class is not graded on a curve.

**Schedule of readings**

You should do the reading for the class day under which it is listed.

With the exception of the book by Mark Kukis, Voices from Iraq: A People’s History, 2003-2009 (Columbia University Press, 2011), and Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (Regan Arts, 2015), all readings can be found on the class Canvas site under “Modules.”

The two course books are available for purchase from the UO Bookstore.

The reading loads for Oct. 18, Nov. 6, and Nov. 13 are heavier than on most other

days. They are crucial for understanding sectarian conflict in Iraq and the turnaround of

2007-2008. The reading for the last week of the term (the book on ISIS) is also quite

heavy and the final paper is due on the last day of class. You should plan accordingly.

**Pt. I: The decision to invade Iraq**

**Sept. 25**: Introduction: the big questions and what we know (or think we know) about the Iraq War

**Read**: In-class handout (also available on course Canvas site): excerpt from Emma Sky, The Unraveling (2015).

**Sept. 27**: Why invade Iraq? The Bush Doctrine and the administration’s decision to

invade

Read: Henry Kissinger, “A False Dream,” excerpted from Iraq War Papers, 5-8;

President Bush, West Point address, June 1, 2002; Kagan and Kristol, “What to Do about

Iraq,” Weekly Standard, January 21, 2002; Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice

Presidency (2008): ch. 9 (215-53).

Discussion topics: what was the Bush Doctrine and how did it differ from how Republican administrations had traditionally defined foreign policy (as represented here by Henry Kissinger)?

**Oct. 2**: Why invade Iraq? Inside the White House and how decisions are made

Compare previous day’s readings to Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (2004): 1-8,

154-66, 173-79, 192-204, 220-35, and 240-54; and Philip Zelikow, “U.S. Strategic

Planning in 2001-02,” from Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, In Uncertain Times:

American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (2011): 96-116.

Questions to think about: How does Bush’s “declarative policy” match up against

the evidence in Woodward’s book? How about Cheney? If this is all you had to go on, what would you conclude about the basis of the decision?

**Oct. 4**: Movie day (I’ll be attending a conference: office hours cancelled)

>>>> Get ahead on reading for next week: next Wednesday’s reading load is unusually large.

**Oct. 9**: Pre-war planning

Read: Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside

Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (2006): ch. 8 (138-163); and excerpts of

interviews with James Fallows and Frederick Kagan on the *Frontline* website (see links

on Canvas site)

**Oct. 11**: The impending invasion as seen from Iraq

Read: “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside” Foreign Affairs vol. 85

(May/June 2006): 2-26. (This article is drawn from a larger book, Iraqi Perspectives

Project, A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (2006) –

a pdf version is posted if you care to take a look). And Mark Kukis, Voices from Iraq, intro and part I (xi-43).

Additional suggested reading: Salam Pax, “Where Is Raed” (blog), January, 2003

(you can access the blog via the Canvas link to Iraq Bloggers Central); and Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (2005): ch. 2 (39-56).

Iraq Bloggers Central is a portal site with links to all English-language Iraqi bloggers, 2003-2009 (see "Iraqi Bloggers (Inactive)").

**Pt. II: Occupation, insurgency and civil war**

**Oct. 16**: The invasion

No reading (lecture day): work on first midterm.

**First on-line assignment due**: Oct. 16, 11 pm, on the course Canvas site

**Oct. 18**: Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions: Sunni and Shi’a, Arab, Kurd, Turkman, and all the rest

**Read**: Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near, ch. 11 ("The Mud Gets Wetter"), 261-

91; Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr, chs. 2, 7, 9, 11; Quil Lawrence, Invisible Nation, ch. 9

(182-201); Kukis, Voices from Iraq, pt. II is also relevant though I’ve formally assigned it below.

**Oct. 23**: Bremer and the CPA

**Read**: Rajiv Chandresekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s

Green Zone (2006): chs. 4, 6, and 12 (58-80, 102-126, 223-233); and see Fred Kaplan’s

piece, “Who Disbanded the Iraqi Army?”

**Oct. 25**: Insurgencies

**Read**: Ahmed Hashim, “The Iraqi insurgency, 2003-2006”; documents from The

Iraq Papers, 248-264; and Kukis, Voices from Iraq, pt. II (47-77).

The Shadid we read last week is also relevant.

Also: take a look at data in the Iraq Index, March 2004, and have a way of consulting it in class (print out, computer, phone …)

**>>>>> Oct. 26, 11 p.m., first paper due**

**Oct. 30**: Military operations

**Read**: Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (2006),

ch. 11 (214-269)

**Nov. 1**: Abu Ghraib and the issue of prisoner abuse

**Read**: Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, ch. 12 (270-297); documents from The Iraq Papers,

422-425, 431-46; and for an account of how the policies described by Ricks from the

perspective of an Iraqi family caught up in it, Farnaz Fasshihi, Waiting for an Ordinary

Day: The Unraveling of Life in Iraq (2008): ch. 15 (136-156).

Additional suggested reading: for one Iraqi's response (by the best-known

English-language Iraqi blogger, Riverbend), see the *Baghdad Burning* blog entries for

March 29 and then April 30, 2004 and following. There is a link on Canvas (it was also

published in vol. 1 of Baghdad Burning, pages 231-5 and 258ff).

**Nov. 6**: A bit of Iraqi politics

**Read**: Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace

(2007): chs. 21-22 and 24-25 (370-402, 418-452); assorted documents from The Iraq

Papers, 306-26 [skim constitution but pay attention to articles 106-113].

Also useful is Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to

Occupation (2009): ch. 11 (242-74).

**Nov. 8**: Iraqi voices

**Read**: Kukis, Voices from Iraq, pts. III and IV (81-171)

**>>>> Nov. 9 second paper due**

**Nov. 13**: The surge and tribal politics

**Read**: David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (2009): ch. 3 (115-185); also

take a look at Iraq Index, December 2006 (this is when Bush announces the "Surge" but

scan data for December, 2006). Make sure to look at civilian death rates. What other

significant indices of the situation do you see?

Additional suggested reading: If you want to get a more visceral sense of what the

situation was like you can read Nir Rosen, “Slaughterhouse,” from Bloodlands (2010) 75-

119. And for a first-hand account of the worsening situation and her family's decision to

leave, see the links to Riverbend's blog, *Baghdad Burning*.

**>>>>> Second on-line midterm due**: Nov. 14, 11 pm

**Pt. III: Iraq since 2011 and the rise of ISIS**

**Nov. 15**: The view from Iraq

**Read**: Kukis, Voices from Iraq, pt. V (175-215), Iraq Index, December 2011; and

Peter Harling, "The New Normal in Baghdad," Le Monde Diplomatique March 1, 2013

**Nov. 20**: The origins of ISIS

**Read**: Weiss and Hassan, chs. 1-4, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 1-67 (original edition)

**Nov. 22:** ISIS continued

**Read:** Weiss and Hassan, chs. 5-7, Isis: Inside the Army of Terror, 68-113

**Nov. 27**: The ISIS Phoenix

**Discuss**: Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 113-178

**Nov. 29**: The Islamic State and its attractions

**Discuss**: Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 179-242

Also useful: Anonymous, "The Mystery of ISIS," New York Review of Books,

August 13, 2015 (a review essay of the book we're reading and a similar book by Jessica

Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (Ecco, 2015)

**FINAL EXAM**: Due on-line, Wednesday Dec. 6, 12:00 noon